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Abstract
This thesis examines the German civil-military relationship and the challenges the country is
facing amidst modernizing reforms to the German armed forces. Over the last quarter of a
century, new international security threats have manifested and continue to transform requiring
Germany to adapt its military and defense policies in order to effectively protect itself and serve
as a capable ally to other member states of international organizations such as NATO and the
EU. The adaptations and reforms required of Germany have led to concern that the cornerstone
civil-military relationship concepts are at risk. In this thesis I identify the major changes to the
armed forces and security policy, evaluate their threat to the civil-military relations in Germany
and explore Germany’s role in current global security challenges.

ii
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Chapter One
Introduction
The modernization of the German Bundeswehr in recent years has been the
subject of fierce debates both within Germany and in the international arena. The
problems and challenges have arisen from international demands, as well as domestic
reforms, which continue to place demands on the German army in a variety of areas, such
as public support, questions about the role of the German army in international affairs
and the future reform of a modernized German military establishment.
Germany is one of the richest countries in the world and is seen therefore as both
a regional and global power. When thinking about the role that Germany currently plays
in global politics it can be hard to remember that just seventy years ago, the end of World
War II left the country in ruins and divided into two antagonistic states. As far as
development is concerned, the economic and political growth Germany (namely West
Germany) achieved in the decades immediately following the war is noteworthy. Within
twenty years, West Germany re-established its democratic government and ensured
economic stability. What sets Germany apart from the rest of the global powers is its
defense policy, structure of the military and the unique constitutionally grounded
relationship it has with the German people. In the last century, the world has gone
through a number of geopolitical transformations, especially when it comes to
geopolitics. We are now in an age of globalization and national borders are not as solid as
before. The dissolution of national borders and the depth of transnational alliances have
set the stage for a competitive and potentially unstable geopolitical future.
In Germany’s case, a global economic and political power has not yet attained the
role of a military power in the world order. After the Cold War a combination of the
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German government’s interest in taking on a more active role in global defense and a call
from Germany’s allies, such as the United States and other NATO member states, for
Germany to take on a larger role in the realm of global defense has catalyzed a number of
changes within Germany’s defense policy and the structuring if its military, the
Bundeswehr. The restructuring and transformation is aimed at modernizing the
Bundeswehr in order to keep up with the rest of the global powers and to ensure that
Germany can retain at least an economic hegemonic role.
When the Bundeswehr was established in 1955, the concept of Innere Führung
was enacted as an attempt to connect the Bundeswehr with the German people and
eradicate any gaps between the military and civil society. Innere Führung translates
roughly to leadership and civic education and utilizes the idea of the citizen in uniform to
form a relationship between the military and German society. The concept was largely
successful due to the structuring of the Bundeswehr as conscription military, which
allowed for Bundeswehr personnel to be citizens in uniform rather than a force of
professional soldiers. In 2011, as a result of the transformation process the Bundeswehr
was restructured to be volunteer-only with the intent of creating a professionalized
military, which poses a potential risk to the established civil-military relationship. Since
the end of World War II, the German people have maintained a pacifist perspective on
international intervention by the Bundeswehr. They have generally approved of
humanitarian and peacekeeping missions mandated by the United Nations, but combat
missions such as occurred in Afghanistan, are deeply frowned upon. Germany is in a
tricky spot between adhering to international pressures to transform and modernize their
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military, and maintaining the close relationship between the Bundeswehr and the German
people.
Military and defense reform are complicated, vast and take years to enact. Since
2003, global events have occurred that I hypothesize, may change German opinion of the
Bundeswehr and their international involvement, setting the stage for more support.
Today, the world is threatened by attacks from terrorist groups and now there is the
devastating and overwhelming migrant crisis throughout the world, many of who are
seeking refuge and asylum within Germany. The reforms set forth for the Bundeswehr
and Germany’s defense policy are more important now than ever.
Thesis
In the following chapters I attempt to answer a number of questions, including:
What does it mean to modernize a military? How far is the German government willing
to go? How far are the German people willing to be pushed? How do the current global
crises affect the German public’s opinions on the Bundeswehr’s increased international
involvement? To answer these questions, I will provide a history of the Bundeswehr since
1955, including an examination of the concepts of Innere Führung and Citizen in
Uniform, and their crucial role in both the establishment of the Bundeswehr and in the
relationship between the military and the German people. Military experts in the
Adenauer government developed the concept of “inner guidance” in 1950. After the
founding of the two German states, Adenauer decided that Germany needed to build an
army, but was well aware of the pacifist tendencies among West Germans so soon after
the disastrous years of World War II. After assuring the support of the American
occupation authorities, the experts met at a monastery between Cologne and Bonn and
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worked out the details of how to launch the army.1 The concept of "inner guidance" refers
to the consciousness of the German solider as a citizen in uniform, in other words a
democratic commitment to the new republic, rather than a closed cadre of soldiers, who
in the past took an oath to the Kaiser, or most recently, to Hitler.2
I will then move on to address what it means for Germany to modernize its
military, summarize the reforms from the White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy
and the future of the Bundeswehr, and examine public reception to those reforms. Lastly,
I will discuss the current global events, and the role that Germany and the Bundeswehr
play.
Germany’s recent history has played a significant role in the Bundeswehr’s
relationship with greater civil society, and in my opinion the relationship played a crucial
role in the rebuilding of the country, its reunification and its transnational relationships
since World War II. That said, the policy decisions Germany makes and the sacrifices
that it is willing to make, whether it is failing to meet some of the international demands,
or increasing the gap between the Bundeswehr and the German people will have an
impact on Germany’s relationship internally and internationally and could have serious
implications in the future for Germany’s regional and global hegemony.
Research Significance
The broader impact and significance of my research has everything to do with a
transitional geopolitical climate. The implications that can be drawn by the international
community calling upon Germany to increase its defense spending and modernize its
military in order to actively engage in international conflicts, include but are not limited
to, the potential for a change in the world order and the role that Germany will take, or
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not take as a global power. Considering Germany’s modern history, the need for a
connection between the Bundeswehr and the German people runs deep and is seen as a
necessity. It can be argued that the close civil-military relationship, which differs from
that which defines other powers, such as the United States, has helped to contribute to the
rebuilding of German democracy and its stabilization not just as a country, but also as a
regional and global player. Germany has the power to decide the role that it wants to take
in the future, but it will be a balancing act between international demands and
maintaining positive relations with its multigenerational pacifist public. The actions and
sacrifices that Germany chooses to make in the coming years to modernize and transform
the Bundeswehr will have an influence on domestic, European and world politics and
relations.
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Chapter Two
History of the Bundeswehr
Establishment of the Bundeswehr
At the end of World War II, the allied forces consisting of the United States,
Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union, made the decision to completely demilitarize
Germany and divide it into two. West Germany would operate under the supervision of
the Western Alliance and East Germany under that of the Soviet Union. By default, East
and West Germany aligned with their supervising powers, creating an apparent cultural
and political division between the countries.
With the Cold War brewing, the two Germanys served as a strategic buffer zone
between east and west. The Western Alliance saw the opportunity to rearm West
Germany in order to create back-up defense forces against the Soviet Union. The idea of
rearmament was not popular in West Germany, but Chancellor Konrad Adenauer
recognized the rebuilding of the German army as a point of negotiation for the country
with the Western Alliance. Adenauer engaged in negotiations with the supervisory
powers in order to achieve sovereignty in exchange for the development of German
armed forces. In addition to creating a more robust defense force for the Western
Alliance, a major goal was to create a common European Defense force, although the
French National Assembly vetoed this idea.
On February 26, 1954 the West German Bundestag contemplated the concept of
reinstating the armed forces. To do so, the German Basic Law would have to be
amended, the act for amendment passed 334 to 144.3 As a result, three amendments, quite
controversial at the time were made to the Basic Law:
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The scope of exclusive legislative jurisdiction of the Federation were extended to
include defence including compulsory military service of men who have
completed their 18th year of age and protection of the civilian population (Article
73);
The constitutional amendment procedure was facilitated in particular with respect
to international treaties serving the defence of the Federal Republic (Art. 79 para.
1 sentence 2)
Treaties on the EDC were declared compatible with the Basic Law (Art. 142a)
(Uhde 2013).
President Theodor Heuss signed the law in to effect on March 26, 1954. Just a few
months later at the Nine Power Conference in London from September 28 – October 3,
1954 Germany was invited to “accede to the Brussels Pact and to NATO”.4
The Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) joined NATO and the
Western European Union in May 1955. Six months after joining NATO and the WEU, on
November 12, 1955 the new German armed forces came into being (they would not
officially be called the Bundeswehr until the passing of the Legal Status of Military
Personnel Act of April 1956) and on November 21, 1955 the first 101 volunteers were
appointed.5 The proposed “plan was to place under NATO command 12 Army divisions
within three years and, one year later, 22 air wings as well as naval forces equipped with
172 ships and boats”.6 The total allotment of troops was set at 500,000, with an additional
105,000 troops for national territorial purposes.7
Although the re-establishment of the German armed forces was at the request of
its allies, the Federal Republic made sure to create the Bundeswehr founded on principles
that reflected the country and ensured integration into greater German society. In order to
do this, a distance had to be created between the new military and those of the past,
namely the Wehrmacht of the NAZI era. The core concept on which the Bundeswehr was
built is Innere Führung, which establishes the role and obligations of the soldier while
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providing for their rights as citizens (directly tied to the concept of the citizen in
uniform). Crucial to Innere Führung’s role in the Bundeswehr is that, “conscience was to
take precedence over obedience where orders contravene the law and diminish human
dignity”.8 This both allowed and encouraged German soldiers to operate on a basis of
morality and ethics. The concept of Innere Führung and the citizen in uniform created a
checks-and-balances system for the armed forces and served as a mechanism to prevent
the military from operating independently from the rest of the country by ensuring its
integration into German society.
Major concerns surrounding rearmament centered on the involvement of former
Wehrmacht personnel in the establishment of the new military forces. Many Germans
wanted a clean separation from the World War II era and that included the employment
of individuals who had served under the regime. In an attempt to curb these concerns,
Adenauer called for the creation of a selection board for anyone applying to be a colonel
or higher, as a way to screen personnel on and individual basis on their involvement in
the atrocities during the NAZI period. Although some remained unsettled, the former
officers and higher ranked personnel from the Wehrmacht were necessary for structure
and training of the newly established forces.
With the Second Federal Border Guard Act of May 1956, the Federal Minister of
Defense was given the authority to convert border guard units into the Bundeswehr.
Roughly 58% (9,500) of the border guards opted to become soldiers in July 1956.9
Despite conscription and the conversion of the border guards, Bundeswehr growth was
slow. It did not reach 400,000 troops until 1963 and the last of the twelve proposed army
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divisions was not placed under NATO control until 1965; the process took significantly
longer than the projected three years.10
The Bundeswehr served as a defensive ally for fellow NATO members, serving
under the organization’s strategy of “massive retaliation”. Despite Germany’s
renouncement of “nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, the Bundeswehr was
equipped with carrier systems for nuclear warheads at the insistence of its NATO
allies”.11 Eventually NATO shifted their strategy to one of “Dêtente” or flexible response.
Throughout NATO defense strategy developments such as the hair directive of 1971 and
the NATO double-track decision of 1979, the German forces remained reliable allies,
despite unease and uncertainty amongst the troops.12 At the end of the day, integration of
the conscript defense forces into German society was considered successful.
The Bundeswehr in a Unified Germany
By 1989 and the fall of the Eastern Bloc, the Bundeswehr finally reached 500,000
personnel. On October 3, 1990 the Germanys reunited after a period of forty-five years of
division. Upon reunification, 90,000 military and 47,000 civilian personnel from the East
German National Volksarmee (NVA) joined the 500,000 military and 170,000 civilian
Bundeswehr personnel.13 Officially, the NVA disbanded just one day earlier on October
2, 2015, but the Bundeswehr absorbed the people, weapons and supplies. Postreunification, global security threats shifted and the combination of reunification and the
increase in military personnel put Germany in a place which no longer allowed them to
evade international military involvement.14 It became necessary for the Bundeswehr to
undergo reforms, the most principal change being shifting from a defense army to, “a
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mobile and flexible military force for operations, while retaining its capacity for national
defense”.15
The Bundeswehr continued to go through processes of transformation and
restructuring, often with specific end goals in mind. In the early 1990s, troops were
divided into Crisis Response Forces (CRF) and Main Defense Forces (MDF), but with
lack of funding, Bundeswehr personnel decreased from 370,000 to 340,000.16 While this
period of transformation was necessary, the ever-changing global security threats and the
Bundeswehr’s involvement in the Balkans demonstrated to both Germany and its allies
that further reorganization and reforms were necessary.
Germany’s new role in global defense resulted in involvement in international
conflicts in Somalia, Cambodia and Afghanistan, but the German public remained
reluctant to support these operations. In 1994, a pivotal legal decision by the German
Constitutional Court quieted complaints by two of the country’s parliamentary groups,
that the Bundeswehr’s involvement in these international conflicts was unconstitutional.
The court cited Article 24 of the German Basic Law stating that the Bundeswehr, “may
enter into a system of mutual collective security with a view to maintaining peace” and
ultimately ruling that, “it is permissible for Bundeswehr military personnel to take part
without limitation in international peace missions beyond NATO territory provided that
such missions are given a UN mandate”.17 In order for the Bundeswehr to take part
combat operations, each case must be reviewed and approved by the Bundestag, the
German parliament (this is where the term parliamentary army comes into play).
Innere Führung
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The driving forces for decisions made by states is a combination of maintaining
international relationships aimed at acquiring power, security and wealth and their
doctrine. According to NATO, doctrine is the “fundamental principles by which military
forces guide their actions in support of objectives”.18 While NATO’s definition is directed
at a state’s military, it can be applied to the decisions of the state on a larger scale. It is
essentially the values by which the state operates in order to achieve a particular goal.
Doctrine connects theory and implementation, and works hand-in-hand with the state’s
ideology.19
The relationship between doctrine and ideology is tied together by the culture of
the nation and the region. While culture is a subjective term and the task of constructing a
definition has historically been no small feat,20 in the context of this thesis, the culture,
and consequently ideology and doctrine held in Germany, in regards to international
involvement and policy-making, have been dictated by the nation’s history, past
decisions and relations. The constructs and policy developments are a reflection of the
culture, ideology and doctrine that emerged in response to the events, which transpired
during the Weimar Republic and more devastatingly, the Third Reich.
Most theory on civil-military relations focuses on the relationship between the
military and the government, and strives to answer, “how civil-military relations sustain
and protect democratic values”.21 Due to the Bundeswehr’s status as a parliamentary
military, aspects of the mainstream civil-military relations theories can be applied to the
German armed forces, but in Germany these relations are not just between the military
and the government, but with German society as a whole.
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Samuel P. Huntington claims that civil-military relations are, “the principle
institutional component of military security policy”.22 These relations provide a necessary
“balance between social values and military function to effectively respond to societal
imperatives (social forces and ideologies) on one hand and functional imperatives
(security threats) on the other.23 For the German Bundeswehr, this balance is carried out
through Innere Führung, which rests at the core of the Bundeswehr and dictates the civilmilitary relationship embedded into German society.24 There is no English translation of
Innere Führung that truly encapsulates the essence of the phrase, although the widely
accepted translation is to leadership and civic education. Per the Federal Defense
Ministry, it is best explained as the military being tightly bound with society and its
values. The idea is that by minimizing the gap between greater society and military
institutions, a mutual understanding, greater adaptability and overall effective security
measures will be successfully realized.25
Innere Führung allows for a distinct differentiation between old and new, and
serves as a mechanism that is intended to prevent the military from operating
independently from the state and greater German society. The differentiation clearly has
to do with the word "Führer," which carries such heavy baggage from the Nazi period.
Inner guidance has to do with individual conscience, as opposed to outward blind
obedience to a leader. The term amounts to a moral force, not of professional soldiers, but
of citizens in uniform who are entitled to the same rights and moral obligations as nonmilitary personnel. One of the main goals of Innere Führung is to integrate the military
into society and create a harmonious relationship between the two. As a method of
integration, leadership under Innere Führung “means that in mission accomplishment, the
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way commanders lead must take account of the prevalent social and political conditions
experienced by military personnel”.26 Additionally, the concept of a citizen in uniform
together with continuous civic education and training cultivates a force that requires
soldiers to constantly re-evaluate their role as an individual in both the military and
German society. This acknowledgement of one’s role and place results in, “the necessary
assuredness and the ability to make sound judgments” in both combat and non-combat
situations.27 The Bundeswehr’s philosophy of Innere Führung enables the preservation of
the citizen in uniform by granting the rights to, “active and passive franchise, the rights to
information, and free expression of opinion, and the rights of free association and
petition”.28
Huntington argued that to “create a democratic army, an ideologically motivated
force embodying subjective rather than objective civilian control” would “reduce the
fighting effectiveness of the new army”.29 While Huntington’s argument sounds logical,
the Bundeswehr and Innere Führung reflect more closely Morris Janowitz’s theory on
constabulatory forces. For Janowitz, the military that serves more as a national police
force and is integrated in society proved to be more effective both in operations and with
civilian control.30 Innere Führung’s integration of the military into civil society adheres
to Janowitz’s assumptions and the idea that, “only those solders who respect the same set
of values as their society are capable of defending that very society”.31
At the time of the establishment of the Bundeswehr, Innere Führung was carried
out through the practice of conscription. All males over the age of 18 were required to
complete a term of military service. One main reason the conscription method worked for
the Bundeswehr in the mid-twentieth century was that it was established as a defense only
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force, as is written in the Basic Law, Article 87a. The extent of the Bundeswehr’s
jurisdiction was aiding police forces in times of defense or tension, but only under the
direction and discretion of the Bundestag or Bundesrat. The period of divided Germanys
beginning in 1945 was a period of redevelopment and rebuilding. In order to establish the
country as strong, trustworthy and eventually once again sovereign, economic, political
and eventually defensive stability needed to be achieved. After ten years picking up the
pieces of the horrific war, both domestically and internationally and relying on foreign
militaries and governments to protect the country and its people, it was time for Germany
to take a stand and declare who it wanted to be and where it wanted to sit in the world
order. The use of Innere Führung as the foundational concept upon which the
Bundeswehr was to be established, demonstrated to the German people, as well as the rest
of the world, the role the country would take on internationally.
A number of scholars argue that the civil-military relationship in Germany is at
risk and that this increasing gap is a consequence of the engagement in international
combat missions such as in Kosovo in the 1990s and more recently, in Afghanistan. 32
Another factor, which can be perceived as having a negative effect on the civil-military
relationship, is the shift, beginning in 2011, from conscription military to volunteer-only
forces.33 This shift raises the foundational question of whether this is an attempt to
maintain a positive relationship during a period of reform and perhaps an increase in
international combat missions, allowing for the justification that members of the armed
forces chose to enlist. Citing Thomas E. Ricks, Tomas Kucera discusses “a civil-military
cultural gap” in the United States after the abolishment of the draft due to a decrease in
interaction between civilians and military personnel.34 This tie leaves us to question if the
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same could happen in Germany. Kucera argues, “soldiers should accept civilian values
and integrate with society, otherwise they are alienated from the society and from the
interest which they should defend.35
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Chapter Three
Modernization
What is Modernization?
Governments, militaries and policies are in a constant state of transformation. As
things work, or do not work, institutions and law makers attempt to make adjustments or
improvements. Although transformation can be categorized as progress, it can often
happen too little too late. The German Bundeswehr has been continuously transforming
since its inception, but now it is enacting great reforms to ideally close the policy and
capability gap between itself and the militaries of its allies.
The term modernizing is a bit troubling since it is not entirely clear what is meant
in the scope of a military. An evaluation of the Bundeswehr would leave many with the
assurance that it is in fact “modernized”, and while in terms of technology and what its
structure looks like, it is a modernized military force. That being said, the Bundeswehr is
an institution founded primarily for defense, not for international offensive combat
missions, and definitely not for the type of ever changing warfare that many of
Germany’s allies have encountered in the last half-century.
For the purposes of this paper modernizing the Bundeswehr refers to the
restructuring of the institution itself and the policy changes that transition the
Bundeswehr from being a purely peace-building institution to an armed force that is fully
equipped and willing to take part in international missions as needed by its allies, whether
it be NATO, the European Defense Council or individual countries such as the United
States. The new policies essentially expand the Bundeswehr’s mandate and aide in the
preparation of the troops to take part in such potential missions. Aspects of the
Bundeswehr are being held on to, such as Innere Führung but now what it means to be a
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German soldier and to be a part of the Bundeswehr has a different meaning and a
different expectation. Modernizing the Bundeswehr means making it look and act (within
reason) as their allies do, it is a way to elevate it in the world order in means of defense
and increase its credibility as a physical ally willing send competent troops.
Why is Modernization Matters
Much like with people, relationships between nations are nothing short of crucial.
When these relationships are positive, the parties involved are referred to as allies. The
assumption is that alliances are formed based on a commonality of a goal, interest, ideal
or enemy. With that said, there is a mutual understanding that, “I’ll scratch your back if
you scratch mine”. As an old adage in foreign policy goes, “nations do not have
permanent friends, only permanent interests”.
During Germany’s period of division East and West German alliances developed
almost naturally by default. East Germany aligned with the Soviet Bloc and eventually
became a part of the Warsaw Pact. West Germany then aligned with the Western
alliances of the United States, Great Britain and France; eventually finding its place as a
member of NATO.
At the end of the Cold War and after the fall of the Soviet Union, East and West
Germany were reunited, a new government was established, but the East German
Volksarmee was absorbed into the West German Bundeswehr. After reunification
Germany retained its alliances and position in NATO.
Throughout the Cold War, West Germany provided political and financial support
to its allies, namely the United States. This policy and approach worked during a period
where no boots were on the ground, but as new conflicts arose, political backing and
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economic support proved to not be enough for Germany’s allies. Post-reunification,
tragic and violent armed conflicts arose throughout the world in Rwanda, the Balkans,
Israel and Palestine, and in the Middle East during the Gulf Wars. Germany’s defense
policy maintained that the Bundeswehr would only get involved in NATO and UN
mandated missions as a humanitarian force. That policy sent troops to Kosovo in the mid1990s during the Serb-Kosovar conflict. While carrying out their peace-building mission,
the deployed troops engaged in armed combat for the first time since the Bundeswehr’s
establishment in 1955. What Germany gained from that mission was the knowledge that
the Bundeswehr was not as equipped for armed combat as it should be.
As previously discussed above, Germany traditionally only provided economic
and political backing to its allies during times of conflict. As the global political climate
shifted, so did the opinion of Germany’s allies. Providing funding demonstrated limited
support, while its allies were risking lives, Germany was hiding behind its pocketbook.
Germany had seats on the European Defense Council, as well as NATO, but had
the inability to demonstrate efficiency and aptitude in armed conflict. As conflicts
continued to unfold and escalate, Germany’s allies decided to call on Germany to
modernize its forces to a level that would prove the country to be a viable ally if need be.
By the time of reunification, Germany had once again established itself amongst
the world powers. The array of armed conflicts that occurred post-reunification sparked a
desire by Germany to become more involved in global defense and policy. The
mechanism through which the country could maintain their foothold would be by
modernizing the Bundeswehr. The changes to come would not only prepare Germany for
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involvement in future combat missions, but also demonstrate to its allies and the world
that it was ready and fully capable to do so.
The White Paper 2006
The German Federal Ministry of Defense’s White Paper 2006 publication outlines
the country’s security and defense policies for the future. Prior to this publication, the last
White Paper was released twelve years earlier. According to a press release by the
German Missions in Australia, the drafting of the newest White Paper has just finished
and is on track to be released mid-2016. While the 2006 White Paper does not account
for many current instances or situations, which have occurred in the almost ten years
since it’s publication, the information included outlines many aspects of the recent
modernization process of the Bundeswehr and is therefore a significant document in the
context of this thesis.
The White Paper 2006 is divided into two parts, the first focusing on German
security policy and the country’s memberships in various international organizations such
as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), United
Nations (UN) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The
second part focuses on the Bundeswehr, changes within the armed forces, and its role in
German security policy. At the point of the White Paper’s publication, global security
issues had been transforming to where international terrorism and weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) served as the front-runners in terms of security risks for Germany
and the international community as a whole. The overarching goal of the German security
policy was to develop a multi-lateral, inter-ministerial networked security system aimed
at taking preventative measures to address potential threats domestically and
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internationally. The importance of international partnerships and alliances is a core
concept throughout the publication, the German government acknowledges that
Germany’s security and development is linked to that of Europe and the entire world. The
country’s intentions to remain a capable ally to other members of its various international
organizations are outlined and emphasized, as is its collaborative movement toward
peace.36
NATO, the EU and the UN have all transformed to adapt to new challenges and
risks and their member nations are expected to follow suit, Germany’s adaptation reforms
included the transitioning of the Bundeswehr into a expeditionary organization.37 The
country’s security policy, as outlined in the 2006 White Paper, heavily emphasizes
networked security systems and claims it is the most effective and encompassing strategy
to modern security threats.
According to the publication, Germany’s international partnerships, specifically
the country’s membership to NATO, are fundamental to German security policy and
therefore it is imperative that the transatlantic relationship with the United States be
continuously deepened and fostered.38 In addition to the active role that Germany plays in
NATO, it is also a prominent member of the European Union and aims to pursue the
strengthening of European stability, as well as a stronger partnership with Russia. Aside
from the country’s role in the two separate organizations, the White Paper stresses that
NATO and the EU are complementary to one another and that it will remain Germany’s
policy to cultivate a deeper relationship between the two in order to, “lead to closer
cooperation and greater efficiency, avoid duplication and fortify European and
transatlantic security”.39 In summation, the White Paper identifies the necessity of
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focusing on conflict prevention at root causes, exacerbating networked security both
inter-ministerial within Germany and through regional and global partnerships and
alliances.
The second portion of the 2006 White Paper is dedicated specifically to the
Bundeswehr. In this document, the German government outlined five major aims of the
Bundeswehr:
1. To guarantee the capacity for action in the field of foreign policy
2. To contribute towards European and global security
3. To maintain national security and defense
4. To provide assistance in the defense of our allies
5. To foster multinational cooperation and integration (White Paper 2006, p 9).
The Bundeswehr’s central task is defined as being national and collective defense and its
mission is influenced by the values, goals and interests put forth in the German Basic
Law. As a consequence of the radically changed security risks, internal and external
security has become severely intertwined therefore supporting Germany’s policy for
networked and collective defense. The publication dictates the primary tasks of the
Bundeswehr as international conflict prevention, supporting Germany’s allies, protecting
Germany and its people, rescue and evacuation in the event of disaster, partnership and
cooperation, and subsidiary assistance.40 Internal terrorist threats would traditionally be
handled by the land authorities, but the outlined security policy of this publication
permits the deployment of Bundeswehr personnel should the situation necessitate and
asserts that the federal government wishes to expand the constitutional framework for the
use of the armed forces.41
The mission and tasks central to the German armed forces are imbedded into the
German Basic Law. In 1994, the constitutional court ruled it legal for the Bundeswehr to
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be deployed out of area for the purposes of collective security (Article 24 (2) of the Basic
Law).42 This ruling provides the Bundeswehr with the legal backing to participate in
international security and prevention operations in concert with its allies and defense
partners. In order for troops to be deployed to out of area operations, permission must be
granted to the Bundeswehr by the Bundestag on a case-by-case basis. The specifics and
parameters of the relationship between the armed forces and parliament are clarified in
The Parliamentary Participation Act. The scope of Bundeswehr employment is explicitly
outlined in Article 24 (2), Article 87a (2), (3), (4) and Article 35 (2), (3) of the German
Basic Law. The Bundeswehr has been reorganized to encompass three groups of forces:
response, stabilization and support. As of the White Paper 2006, the goal for 2010 is to
have a total of active personnel will be 252,500 with 2,500 reservists and 75,000
civilians.43
Essential to the armed forces is the concept of Innere Führung, and its
relationship with conscription. According to the White Paper, “Innere Führung stands for
the realisation that the capability to act on security matters requires a successful
interchange between politics, society and the military”.44 This philosophy gives military
personnel an identity and a recognizable place within German society. Innere Führung
together with universal conscription ensure that the Bundeswehr is anchored in society.
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Article 24

Article87a

Article 35

(2) With a view to maintaining
peace, the Federation may enter
into a system of mutual collective
security; in doing so it shall
consent to such limitations upon
its sovereign powers as will bring
about and secure a lasting peace
in Europe and among the nations
of the world.

(2) Apart from defence the
Armed Forces may be employed
only to the extent expressly
permitted by this Basic Law

(2)(…) in order to respond to a
grave accident or a natural
disaster, a Land may call for the
assistance of police forces of
other Laender of personnel and
facilities of other administrative
authorities of the Armed Forces,
or of the Federal Border Police.

(3) During a state of defence or
state of tension the Armed Forces
shall have the power to protect
civilian property and to perform
traffic control functions to the
extent necessary to accomplish
their defence mission. Moreover,
during a state of defence or a state
of tension, the Armed forces may
also be authorized to support
police measures for the protection
of civilian property: in this event
the Armed Forces shall cooperate
with the competent authorities.

(3) If the natural disaster or
accident endangers the territory of
more than one Land, the Federal
Government, insofar as is
necessary to combat the danger,
may instruct the Land
governments to place police
forces at the disposal of other
Laender, and may deploy units of
the Federal Border Police or the
Armed Forces to support the
police. Measures taken by the
Federal Government pursuant to
the first sentence of this
paragraph shall be rescinded at
any time at the demands of the
Bundesrat, and in any event as
soon as the danger is removed.

(4) In order to avert an imminent
danger to the existence or free
democratic basic order of the
Federation or of a Land, the
Federal Government, if the
conditions referred to in
paragraph (2) of Article 91 obtain
and the police forces and the
Federal Police Force prove
inadequate, may employ the
Armed Forces to support the
police and the Federal Border
Police in protecting civilian
property and in combating
organized armed insurgents. Any
such employments of the Armed
Forces shall be discontinued if
the Bundestag or the Bundesrat
so demands.

Table 1: Bundeswehr Employment per the German Basic Law (German Basic Law Art. 24(2),
Art. 87a(2,3,4), Art. 35(2,3))
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The importance of conscription to the Bundeswehr is heavily emphasized in the
White Paper, as is the Federal Government’s intention to preserve the practice (although
it is important to note that conscription ended in 2011). The conscription process was an
integral part of the civil-military relationship in Germany. It not only guaranteed the
personnel necessary for potential operations, but also allowed for a well-rounded armed
force as a result of the various backgrounds and wide range of education the conscripts
embodied. In the 2005 Coalition Agreement, the intent of the Federal Government to
continue the conscription was outlined and at the time of this publication, the Federal
Minister of Defense called for an increase of conscripts by more than 6,500 in one year.45
According to section 3.6 of the White Paper, many of the reforms set forth have a
financial basis. Since reunification, defense spending continued to be cut and the
restructuring of the Bundeswehr is aimed at creating the most cost effective and efficient
force as possible. Joint operations with Germany’s European and transatlantic alliances
will help to ease the financial burden of the Bundeswehr and contracting with the private
sector will ease the strain on Bundeswehr personnel.46
The Bundeswehr recognizes that, “only Nations with a strong defense industry
have the appropriate clout in Alliance decisions” and therefore intends to expand the
industry within Germany.47 The idea is that by minimizing the outsourcing of defense
technology, Germany will be able to build up the domestic industry and consequently
gain decision-making leverage within NATO. Reiterating one of the main thematic
threads of the White Paper 2006, section 3.7 on Armaments emphasizes collaboration and
the deepening of partnerships between nations and alliance organizations. In this section,
it is made clear that the Germany and its armed forces are willing to develop partnerships
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with nations both in and out of NATO, as long as they hold common goals and defense
policies.48
The last section in Chapter Three of the White Paper 2006 focuses on the
restructuring of the Bundeswehr. According to this section NATO and the EU determined
deficiencies in the defense strategies of member nations and urged those states to take the
necessary steps to eradicate those deficiencies.49 For the Bundeswehr this meant
developing restructuring and procurement strategies, which would lead the German
armed forces to both meet international alliance and defense demands, as well as falling
within budgetary constraints. After the enactment of the restructuring set forth in this
document, the majority of the Bundeswehr will consist of stabilization forces with a goal
of having the capability of deploying up to 14,000 troops in up to five operations at one
time.50 To meet the operational requirements of Germany’s partner organizations, the
Bundeswehr is proposed to provide up to 15,000 troops to the NATO response force, up
to 18,000 to the European Union Headline Goal and up to 1,000 troops to the United
Nations Stand by Arrangement System.51 The cumulative goal for the year 2010, as
outlined by the White Paper is 327,500 Bundeswehr personnel consisting of 252,500
military personnel and 75,000 civilian posts.52 Of military personnel, troops will be
divided into three categories of force: 35,000 response forces, 70,0000 stabilizations
forces and 147,000 support forces.53
Chapter Four of the White Paper 2006 details the current operations in which the
Bundeswehr is involved, as well as their justifications. As of 2006, the Bundeswehr was
involved in ten operations in Europe, the Middle East and Africa operating under NATO
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missions, EU missions, UN missions, African Union (AU) missions, or against
international terrorism.54

NATO

EU

UN

AU

KFOR- Kosovo
Force (Kosovo)

EUFOR- EU Force
(Bosnia and
Herzegovina)

UNMIS- UN
Mission in Sudan

AMIS- African
Union Mission in
Sudan

ISAF–
International
Security Assistance
Force
(Afghanistan)

EUFOR RD Congo
– EU Force
(Democratic
Republic of the
Congo)

UNMEE – UN
Mission in
Ethiopia and
Eritrea

International
Terrorism
Active EndeavourMediterranean
region under North
Atlantic Treaty
Article 5
Enduring Freedombased in Djibouti,
Horn of Africa

UNOMIG- UN
Observer Mission
in Georgia
UNAMA- UN
Assistance Mission
in Afghanistan
UNIFIL- UN
Interim Force in
Lebanon

Table 2: Bundeswehr Operations Abroad (White Paper 2006 p. 73)

The detailed transformation process of the German armed forces is described in
Chapter Five of the White Paper 2006. The goal of the transformations was to create an
armed force, which is capable of achieving constant adaptability to changing security
situations and operational needs.55 All areas of the Bundeswehr were subjected to
transformation reforms including the improvement of concept development and
experimentation, network-enabled operations, force categories and the expansion of
military capabilities. The capabilities of the Bundeswehr are set to include command and
control, intelligence collection and reconnaissance, mobility, effective engagement,
support and sustainability and survivability and protection.56 In order to reach the
proposed capabilities, the Bundeswehr would need to tighten communications and
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networking to maximize joint operability; optimize the collection and analysis of
situational information through the Bundeswehr’s Military Intelligence Organization;
achieve sufficient mobility capabilities; display force, spatial, temporal and informational
adequacies; provide support to personnel taking part in domestic and international
operations; and ensuring the protection and safe transport of personnel and materials.57
The transformation of the Bundeswehr outlined in the White Paper is laid out to adhere to
policies set forth by NATO and the EU.58
The organization of the Federal Ministry of Defense and the Bundeswehr is
intended to streamline duties and administrative tasks. In the context of the Army, Air
Force and Naval forces, the aim of the command organization is to increase force
capability and operation flexibility while achieving maximum effectiveness.59 The Joint
Support Services are configured to minimize strain on the various branches of the armed
forces by providing services such as logistical support, military intelligence, military
police and joint training through a centralized source; the Armed Forces Office.60 Similar
to the Joint Support Services, the German Joint Medical Service, provide an array of
health services to all areas of the armed forces, with the exception of a handful of
specialized forces and institutes within the armed forces.61 Other offices under the
Federal Ministry of Defense consist of the Federal Defense Administration, which is
required by German Basic Law Article 87b to operate independent of the armed forces;
the military legal system containing a civilian structure; and the availability of chaplain
services for personnel.62
While the organizational and capabilities structure of the German armed forces
and its related offices is crucial, as is the recruitment, retention and composition of its
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personnel. Civilian personnel cuts as a result of budget cuts account for 80% of personnel
reductions in the Bundeswehr since 1991 and at the time of the publication of this
document, there remained 177,000 civilian employees with further reductions projected
to leave 75,000 civilians by 2010.63 Outlined in Chapter Seven are ways in which the
Bundeswehr attempts to increase recruitment, namely of temporary volunteers and noncommissioned offices (NCOs) who offer a wide spectrum of experiences and education;
by balancing the income discrepancy between East and West German personnel; offering
a supplemental stipend for foreign deployment; the offering of comprehensive benefits
for personnel who took part in foreign operations; and the family and work harmony
provided by employment in the Bundeswehr.64 As of 2006, the Bundeswehr consisted of
regular and temporary volunteers of various vocations and ages, which were closely
monitored and kept in harmony; Basic and Extended Service Conscripts, which aid in
easing the training obligations of the Bundeswehr through the wide-range of educational
achievements of conscripted personnel; reservists, numbering up to 100,000; and civilian
personnel.65
It has been almost ten years since the publication of this White Paper and the
2016 White Paper will not made accessible until mid-2016 with a more updated Germany
Security Policy and Military organization. Despite the lack of publicly accessible
government documents deliberately outlining the contemporary security policy within
Germany, overt changes, such as the end of conscription prove that the policies in
Germany have continued to adapt as security threats and challenges transfigure.
Public Reception
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The reforms published in the White Paper 2006 were aimed as ensuring the
operational capabilities of the Bundeswehr in potential situations for the future. The
reforms, which began in 2003, were implemented shortly after the start of Germany’s
involvement in NATO operations in Afghanistan. Since the end of World War II,
Germans have maintained a pacifist attitude when it comes to involvement in
international conflict.66 According to the 2007 Global Peace Index (GPI), Germany
ranked as the twelfth most peaceful nation out of the 121 analyzed.67 Between 2005 and
2007, Bundeswehr reforms were being carried out and the nation’s involvement in the
NATO ISAF mission continued to grow. The reforms, while maintaining Innere Führung
and trying to preserve the citizen in uniform led to a shift in the capabilities of the
Bundeswehr, which to caused it to cross over into uncharted territory operationally, but
also in terms of social perception and acceptance. The response of the German public to
the reforms is tied together with the views on Germany’s international involvement at the
time.
According to a poll conducted in 2005, 80% of Germans polled held a positive
view of the Bundeswehr, 60% believed that the German armed forces had a positive
impact internationally, and only 34% opposed NATO’s ISAF in Afghanistan.68 In the
same survey, 53% of those questioned, supported keeping conscripted service for the
Bundeswehr, which according to the White Paper 2006 was cornerstone to the goal of
Innere Führung.69 Despite the high support for the continuation of conscription, just one
year earlier, of the 150,000 Germans up for conscripted service, 80,000 objected to
military service.70 While these numbers demonstrate overall support for the Bundeswehr,
its involvement in international missions was not met with as much positive backing.
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Only 29% of Germans fully supported the Bundeswehr, with 79% claiming they were
happy with the work being done by the armed forces.71 The majority polled believed that
the Bundeswehr should protect Germany against external threats, but believed that
Germany should focus its attention on domestic issues; a reported 35% supported
executing an active foreign policy.72
The reluctance of the German people to become involved with international
conflicts could have been due to a number of reasons, ranging from a true culture of
pacifism to a lack of security concerns.73 In 2006, Minister of Defense, Franz-Josef Jung
expressed concern that the German public may not fully understand the current and
potential security threats to the nation.74 The changes in global security challenges left
nations, such as Germany to navigate the unknown and develop policy in preparation of
situations, which had not previously been encountered. The support demonstrated by the
German people toward the Bundeswehr, reflects the good deeds and intentions of the
armed forces, such as delivering humanitarian aid and assisting in case of natural
disasters. The Bundeswehr was created in a way that emulated the German culture and
perspective; the reforms published in the White Paper did not overtly impose on that
essence, leading to the continuation of support of the Bundeswehr as an institution. As the
German government attempted to prepare to take on future challenges and assert itself as
a capable ally, the German people also were thrown into an unfamiliar situation.
Reluctance of international involvement had been the trend since the end of World War
II, supporting combat operations abroad and inserting themselves into conflicts which
were not their own, would have be an remarkable shift in German societal norms.
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In 2010, the Bundeswehr underwent another set of reforms to help reduce the cost
of the operation of the armed forces. The major components were: eliminating
conscripted service, reducing military and civilian personnel, closing thirty-one and
downsizing ninety Bundeswehr bases, reducing personnel within the Defense Ministry,
and cutting defense projects by billions.75 As of 2014, the Bundeswehr had 5,000 soldiers
deployed in international operations, yet the German public’s attitude toward
international involvement remained similar to that between 2005 and 2007.76 In a survey
conducted by the Federal Foreign Office, two-thirds of those polled were against more
international involvement.77 In another poll, only 20% of Germans believed Germany
should take on more responsibility within NATO and 58% expressed their belief that
conflicts should be solved through diplomacy and money rather than military force.78
Almost a decade after the initial surveys, the German public’s resistance to engage in
international conflicts lingers.
The reforms set forth by Karl-Josef Jung and Thomas de Maiziére have targeted
the increase of capabilities and economic efficiency of the armed forces and the Ministry
of Defense. The former Ministers of Defense attempted to make changes while trying to
preserve the constitutional relationship between the German people and the Bundeswehr,
but as new challenges emerge and the Bundeswehr adapts to tackling them, the civilmilitary relationship is also transitioning and adapting to the new roles being taken on by
Germany and its armed forces.
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Chapter Four
The Bundeswehr Today
9/11 and the New War on Terror
The terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 marked a shift in
global security and the types of threats to nation states. In response to the devastating
attacks, the United States and its allies took up arms against terrorism to reinstate world
security. Fourteen years after the attacks, troops from around the world remain deployed
and engaged in conflict and rebuilding missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and have
support missions and intelligence units across the globe. The War on Terror has expanded
to encapsulate terrorism in all its guises throughout the world. As a member of NATO,
Germany has been involved in anti-terror strategies from the beginning, the country’s
military involvement has been a careful balance between supporting and defending its
NATO allies and aligning with the views of domestic public opinion. The fight against
terrorism is comprehensive and does not solely rely on military force. Countries around
the world partake in domestic and international operations in order to combat and prevent
terrorist threats.
After the attacks on 9/11, the United States called upon the North Atlantic Treaty
Article 5, which requires all NATO states to come to the aid of any member who invokes
the article. An attack on one, in other words, is an attack on all. In December 2001,
German parliament approved Bundeswehr contribution to NATO’s International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.79 The German chancellor at the time, Gerhard
Schröder, originally gained German public support for his stance against the invasion of
Afghanistan but was forced to undergo a vote of confidence for then supporting the
German contribution to the mission.80 Two years later in 2003 the United States rallied
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for support for the war in Iraq, which is also known as “Operation Iraqi Freedom”. After
the country’s involvement in Afghanistan, Germany chose to withhold support to the
United States for a war in Iraq.81 The sentiment expressed in Germany and the rest of
Europe was that the United States was ignoring the concerns of its allies, while making
unilateral decisions.82 Despite the variances in strategic opinions, Germany intends to
provide ceaseless support to NATO and its other allies in the international fight against
terrorism.83
After initial deployment for Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001 to dislodge the
Taliban, the Bundeswehr took over the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in the
Kunduz province in Afghanistan, as well as the ISAF Regional Command (RC) North in
Mazar-i-Sharif in the northern part of the country in 2003.84 The role of the German
armed forces during this time was to support reconstruction in the region, under a very
ambiguous mandate; this resulted in the Bundeswehr providing neither direct security nor
reconstruction.85 As of 2014, there remained 1,800 Bundeswehr soldiers deployed in
Afghanistan under ISAF.86
In addition to the troop contribution in Afghanistan, NATO nations also partook
in establishing a number of groups and offices to aid in the war against terrorism. In
2004, NATO established the Defense Against Terrorism Programme of Work (DATPOW) to carry out a wide range of projects to combat terrorist activities.87 Projects are
aimed at ensuring the capability to protect against chemical, biological, nuclear and
radiological attacks; maintaining up-to-date and secure technology; and the maintenance
of infrastructure.88 The Centre of Excellence-Defense Against Terrorism (COE- DAT)
analytical and advisory board was created in 2005, to which Germany continues to
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contribute both financial and personnel support.89 Additionally, there is also a NATO
Terrorism Threat Intelligence Unit, as well as a NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense
Center of Excellence. The global strategy against fighting terrorism has been through
comprehensive networked defense, between individual nations, alliances, as well as
international organizations such as NATO, the UN, the EU and OSCE.
Within Germany, defenses against terrorism have also been developed and
continue to adapt to changing security threats and conditions. In Berlin, there is the Joint
Counter-Terrorism Centre (GTAZ), which services as an operational communications
platform for the cooperation of forty domestic security agencies.90 Staying true to the
country’s emphasis on networked security, the GTAZ is operated by the cooperation of
representatives from agencies such as the Federal Office for Protection of the
Constitution, Military Counter Intelligence Service and criminal police offices of federal
states. As a mechanism to improve communication between types of agencies of GTAZ,
two analysis units have been created; the Intelligence Information and Analysis Unit
(NIAS) and the Police Information and Analysis Unit (PIAS), which work together to
form working groups aimed at counter-terrorism.91 To effectively battle terrorist threats,
domestically and internationally Germany has employed an approach encompassing the
use of military forces through NATO, police forces, economic and civil components to
ensure the safety of its people and those of its allies.92
Today, Germany continues the fight against global terrorist groups such as the
Islamic State. In an attempt to assist affected areas, such as Iraq, the Bundeswehr has
provided Iraqi military and Kurdish fighters with arms and is in the process of training
the fighters to protect themselves against terrorist infiltrations.93 As the Islamic State
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strives to gain more territory and recruit members from all over the world, Germany and
its allies continue to adapt their counter-terrorism strategies to address and predict
potential attacks.
On Friday November 13, 2015, a horrifying terrorist attack was carried out in
Paris, France at six different locations throughout the city, almost simultaneously. The
attacks left at least 129 dead, hundreds wounded and at least 100 in critical condition.94 In
response, over 150 raids have been carried out in France and Belgium.95 The international
community has shown unwavering support to France and the United States and Germany
have claimed to stand in solidarity with France in the aftermath of this event.96 While the
fight on terror has not ceased, this attack has revitalized international collaborative
conversations to adequately respond and effectively fight international terrorism. The
global response to this devastating attack and the repercussions that will follow continue
to unfold. NATO nations, including Germany have demonstrated willingness to
comprehensively support France during this time, including but not limited to military
support.
Cyber Security and Cyber Warfare
The world has grown increasingly smaller with the use of the Internet, but it has
exposed vulnerabilities in both the spheres of civil society and government. IT networks
have improved the collaboration between government agencies and transnational
partnerships. The accessibility to information has exponentially increased, and economic
possibilities broadened. While the Internet has had many positive influences on the
world, it also has the potential to pose multiple security threats. Cyber norms and policies
continue to be developed and the more extensive presence of cyber security threats has
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required states and international actors to establish cyber security protocol in attempts to
counter ever-increasing cyber threats.
Cyber attacks are of great risk because they are low risk and high reward to the
perpetrators but high risk to the targets. Individuals, corporations and governments can all
be targets of cyber crime but attacks on government and state entities can be particularly
dangerous because attacks on a network that houses military, transportation,
telecommunication or to the power grid information could have wide spread and
devastating impacts.97 NATO’s Tallinn Manual, a nonbinding document compile by
experts on cyber security defines a cyber attack as, “a cyber operation, whether offensive
or defensive that is reasonably expected to cause injury or death to a person or damage or
destruction to objects”.98 Cyber threats range from cyber crime, which is a broad term
and can target any entity or individual; to cyber terrorism, aimed at inciting terror on a
group or state; to cyber warfare, which is characterized by a state targeting the IT
networks or cyber security of another state.99
In addition to working with international organizations such as the EU and
NATO, Germany is a part of a bilateral cooperative with the United States regarding
cyber security and regulation. The goals of this partnership are to ensure internet freedom
and regulation, enhance partnerships in the private sector as well as with other nations in
the hopes of creating cyber regulatory norms for government while maintaining freedom
and innovation.100 The two countries are working together to expand communication on
cyber security to more effective fight cyber crime and detect potential threats.101 Borders
do not confine cyber space and therefore the development of solutions to ensure global
security must also be transnational.
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Transnational security measures and cooperation are imperative to the prevention
of cyber attacks and cyber warfare, but so are internal collaborative partnerships, which is
why Germany continues to develop its own cyber security. One mechanism established
by the German government in 2011 is the Nationales Cyber-Abwehrzentrum (National
Cyber Defense Center), which works to maximize the cooperation between agencies in
the prevention and response of cyber threats.102 Goals of Germany’s international cyber
polices are to optimize potential freedoms through Internet use, prevent cyber attacks,
maximize economic opportunities and improve diplomatic and international
communication.103 Essential to an effective cyber policy is finding a balance between
regulation and freedom, and collaborative work to prevent attacks through innovative
military capacities.104 Similar to the federal government’s establishment of GTAZ for
counter-terrorism, the Joint Internet Centre (GIZ) promotes cooperation and working
groups between various federal ministries such as the Federal Criminal Police Office and
the Military Counterintelligence Service.105 GIZ operates to monitor the online activities
of extremists and potential terrorists in order to identify and intercept possible threats.106
The creation of these various offices within the federal government ensure the application
of cyber-security policies and while providing the opportunity for the adaptation of
responses as threats manifest and transform.
Adapting to cyber security threats and demands is a relentless task, which can be
difficult to sustain. The German Defense Ministry is in the process of writing the White
Paper 2016 on German security policy, and in doing so, an expert workshop on cybersecurity was held in recent months in attempt to develop the best cyber security policy
possible.107 While the Bundeswehr tracks and monitors cyber threats through the
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Bundeswehr IT centers, the construction and adoption of cyber warfare policies is
ongoing.108 Currently in effect are the international rules on cyber warfare published
under former minister Thomas de Maiziére, adhering to the NATO Tallinn Manual which
advises that cyber conflict must abide by international law and the international laws of
war.109
Cyber security, whether it is an individual attack, cyber terrorism or cyber warfare
is of high priority in German and international security spheres. Cyber threats can be very
volatile and have the potential to be devastating on various levels. Developing effective
and comprehensive cyber and defense policies remain in the early stages, as cyber threats
pose a relatively new global security challenge. The German military and government, in
partnership with international organizations continue to work to improve policy and adapt
as threats escalate.
Ursula von der Leyen
During each term of Angela Merkel’s chancellorship, she has appointed a new
Federal Defense Minister amidst the extensive reforms to the Bundeswehr. In 2013, at the
beginning of her third term, Merkel appointed Ursula von der Leyen to Federal Minister
of Defense, and appointed former minister, Thomas de Maiziere as her Federal Minister
of the Interior. Von der Leyen, a member of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) has
the reputation of being a radical reformer. This reputation and her political resume set the
stage for von der Leyen to drive home the reforms set in place during the previous
decade.
Before entering politics, Ursula von der Leyen studied economics, completed a
doctorate in medicine, served as a research assistant in Epidemiology and completed a
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Masters in Public Health.110 In addition to her professional career, she is also a married
mother of seven children. She has been criticized as both a mother and a politician, but
despite push back, von der Leyen has held a number of roles in both local and federal
government and is now the first female Federal Minister of Defense in Germany. Leading
up to her appointment as the Federal Minister of Defense, von der Leyen was active in
her local government in Hannover, served on the Land Parliament in Lower Saxony, then
as the Minister for Social Affairs, Women, Family Affairs and Health of Lower
Saxony.111 Transitioning into the federal realm in 2004, von der Leyen continues to be a
member of the CDU Presidium, was appointed by Merkel as the Federal Minister for
Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth in 2005, and began her tenure as a
member of the Bundestag and was then Merkel’s appointee as the Federal Minister of
Labour and Social Affairs in 2009. Her ambitions, drive and success in previous positions
have led many to speculate that she could potentially be Merkel’s successor as
Chancellor. Von der Leyen’s main objective as Federal Minister of Defense is to reform
the Bundeswehr, a process that had been ongoing for almost a decade when von der
Leyen took office in 2013.
Von der Leyen and the armed forces are faced with a number of obstacles, the
most prevalent being functional and financial shortcomings. In September 2014, a series
of transportation mishaps occurred while trying to deliver arms to security forces in Iraq
and revealed the dilapidated state of many of the Bundeswehr’s air transportation
vehicles.112 German defense specialist Thomas Weigold said that equipment shortfalls are
a result of a policy, which maximized the use of military equipment with little
accumulation of spare parts, leading to the German Air Force using planes that have been
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in operation for up to fifty years.113 Online news magazine SpiegelOnline reported that
only one of four submarines is operational, 110 of 180 Boxers are deployable, two of
thirty-three helicopters operational, and these numbers do not clarify whether the
equipment is fully or partially operational.114 Due to its shortcomings in capabilities,
Germany was unable to meet the 2014 NATO Defense Planning Process target and as a
result would have been unable to assist its NATO allies should the situation arise.115
NATO urges member states to spend at least 2% of their annual GDP on defense, in 2014
Germany only spent 1.29% of GDP but according to some government sources, Germany
plans to increase defense spending by 6.2% in the next five years.116
Despite political opposition and equipment deficiencies, Defense Minister von der
Leyen appears motivated to continue the modernization of the Bundeswehr and increase
international involvement. According to former Commissioner for the Armed Forces,
Hellmut Königshaus, since von der Leyen entered office, there seems to be a shift in the
attitude of the Bundeswehr and the defense minister is more open and receptive to
concerns regarding the state of the Bundeswehr.117 Von der Leyen is an avid supporter of
coalition and partnerships and firmly supports NATO as an active alliance. She strives for
a more unified Europe and stands steadfastly behind international law. In an article
published in The Guardian, Joachim Koschnicke identified von der Leyen as, “one of the
more popular politicians” but her seemingly radical reforms and opinions could result in
stark opposition, even from within her party.118
Since her appointment in 2013, Ursula von der Leyen has taken steps toward
further reformation of the German armed forces. She is facing criticism as well as,
practical obstacles such as a lack of functional equipment, a stressed defense budget, and
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a severe deficit of volunteers since the end of the conscription in 2011. Despite these set
backs, perhaps one of the most drastic steps has been the launch of an attractiveness
campaign to attract young Germans to join the military. The objective of this campaign is
to improve the work-life balance of military personnel. Many of the Bundeswehr reforms
were focused on structure and efficiency; von der Leyen seeks to reform the
personnel/personal aspect of the Bundeswehr. In order to do this, the armed forces will be
made more family-friendly and she seeks to appeal to young people to join the German
professional army and therefore must make it competitive and comparable to companies
aiming to do the same. The specifics of von der Leyen’s reforms for attractiveness will be
discussed in the following chapter.
In line with the objectives outlined in the White Paper 2006 for the Bundeswehr,
von der Leyen has been vocal about European and transatlantic defense partnerships. In
March 2015, at the tenth Brussels forum, von der Leyen called for a European army as a
way to increase stability, as well as European and transatlantic security.119 After asserting
that Western countries and their democratic values are a target for groups such as the
Islamic State, she displayed the needs to cultivate deeper alliances through the already
established organizations of the EU, NATO and the OSCE; this includes partnerships
between these organizations.120 Von der Leyen believes in the need for a unified
European army to ensure stability and support the already unified market and currency,
and the openness of borders and the migration between them. The final point of her
statement in Brussels was the progress that the Bundeswehr has already made toward
these goals, such as the Franco-German Brigade, a German decision of the Dutch
airborne brigade (and potentially the same with a naval component) and a naval
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partnership with Poland.121 Von der Leyen’s goals of reform of the Bundeswehr are not
confined to the German armed forces, but rather stretch across European and transatlantic
borders to reform collective security polices.
The Attractiveness Campaign
The role that conscription played in the Bundeswehr was two-fold. It maintained
the Bundeswehr’s integration into German society, but also it ensured a number of
personnel each year. The German armed forces during the period of conscription were
not large in the scope of global militaries, nor for the size of Germany but conscription
allowed for personnel numbers to be maintained. Adhering to the demands of the people,
the Germany became the first country in the world to allow individuals to abstain from
mandatory military service based solely on personal objections and beliefs; those of
conscription age could opt out of military service and fulfill their civil service obligation
through other means, such as working in a hospital residence for the elderly. While
acceptable to the German public, the result was a dip in numbers for annual Bundeswehr
inductions. Maintaining Bundeswehr personnel numbers would become even more
difficult for Germany in 2011 with the repeal of conscription. The set of reforms and
restructuring under which compulsory military service was removed, left the Bundeswehr
with a standing army of roughly 175,000; a 30% reduction from the 250,000 before the
2010 reorganization reforms.122
The end of conscription meant the transition of the Bundeswehr to a volunteeronly force, and the development into a professional armed force. Since the introduction
of the Bundeswehr, few military personnel were considered professional soldiers, but in
order to ensure the maintenance of numbers and fruitfully carry out operations falling
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under the recent reforms, Germany needed to find a way to increase enlistment rates and
retain those recruits. Compared to other German employers, the Bundeswehr does not pay
very well, is dangerous, and is not very family-friendly. It is understandable why the
Bundeswehr may not appeal to many young German men and women, not to mention the
ongoing political reluctance to engage in international missions. While many of the
reforms were aimed at operational and fiscal efficiency, none was targeted at improving
the lives of military personnel. Upon her appointment to office, Federal Minister of
Defense Ursula von der Leyen saw a need to develop a mechanism to increase
recruitment and retention of military personnel. Von der Leyen’s solution was to launch a
campaign aimed at increasing the attractiveness of the Bundeswehr as an employer. The
result was; “Bundeswehr in Führung Aktiv. Attraktiv. Anders.”. Von der Leyen’s
proposed plan was published and is accessible through the Bundeswehr website. The
document outlines eight topics and twenty-nine measures of resolve as a way to improve
the personnel aspect of the Bundeswehr, as well as a potential timeline for the
accomplishment of each task.
The first topic is the Leadership and Organizational Culture of the Bundeswehr.
Overall, this topic is aimed at creating the Bundeswehr to be a positive and motivating
workplace through command structure and good leadership. In order to accomplish this
goal, the three methods proposed contain some form of training; the first is an Action
Program titled “Good Leadership Structure”, carried out through a leadership school; the
second is titled “Good Leadership from the Start”, a training program in concert with the
Center for Innere Führung to teach about modern leadership from the very beginning of
one’s military service; the third is Coaching the Top Staff which is aimed at teaching

44
command staff how to take an active role in modeling and developing the new leadership
culture of the Bundeswehr.
The second topic, Mobilizing Potentials focuses on personnel management and
recruitment for the Bundeswehr. Ideally the Bundeswehr will work with potential recruits
to offer then positions based on their talents, interests and aptitude. Also a tool in
recruitment will be E-recruiting with access to job postings and eventually online
registration and application to the Bundeswehr. The agenda also calls for a quicker
reaction time to applicants. The new plan outlines that interested men and women will
receive a response within one week of their application and their entry and placement
process will be of high priority. For those who do choose a career in the armed forces,
opportunities for further training and development that will add to the value of the
individual in both the Bundeswehr and the private sector will be made available and
highly encouraged. Hand in hand with continuous training and development is the
strengthening of the internal labor market. Strengthening the internal labor market aims
to retain personnel in the armed forces. It will allow for more flexibility for employees to
move to different departments and jobs while remaining in the Bundeswehr.
Improving the balance between work and family is the third point of improvement
for the Bundeswehr. The ultimate goal is to make the military more family-friendly
through flexibility and support of family members. First on the agenda is to close the
childcare gaps by increasing childcare facilities and tailoring their operating hours to the
shifts of Bundeswehr personnel. Additionally, the Bundeswehr will provide central
support to families regarding relocations, and on other necessary topics relating to
service, family and social concerns; with the goal of directly connecting Bundeswehr
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families with the relevant contacts and information as quickly as possible.
Acknowledging the difficulties Bundeswehr families encounter during periods of
deployment, military personnel will be provided with free communication through phone
and Internet during their operational tours. Unfortunately, this does not yet apply to those
in naval divisions at sea, but according to the agenda, strides are being taking to extend
this opportunity to naval personnel in the future.
Topic four address Working Autonomy within the Bundeswehr. This includes a
long-term time account, which will allow personnel to build something of a savings
account for paid-time off with the flexible options of using it for things such as childcare,
personal wellness or in times of emergency. There will also be opportunities for
personnel to work remotely; the Bundeswehr plans to provide 3,000 laptops and 3,000
tablets and smart phones for this purpose.123 Working remotely will ideally reduce
burdens on commuters, which at the time of this publications accounted for 38% of
Bundeswehr personnel.124 Part-time operations will be encouraged when possible for up
to 1,000 military personnel and 10,400 civilian employees.125 The part-time opportunities
will also be made available during periods of maternal/paternal time. Personnel will have
the option to reduce their weekly hours and effort will be made to ensure they are close to
their homes, with the exception of periods of operations or training.
Career paths within the Bundeswehr will be diversified with more promotional
and development opportunities, as well as longer times at each post. Maximizing time
spent at each posts creates stability for Bundeswehr families with the ability to create
relatively long-term plans and successfully prepare for relocations. The Bundeswehr aims
to become more transparent with personnel, creating a trusting bond between
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management and employee. One mechanism of transparence will be an online portal with
service information and opportunities; allowing personnel to stay informed and apply for
positions in which they are interested.
A large part of any job is staying healthy and the Bundeswehr’s six point of
reform strives to achieve that. Falling under the subject of health is making the
Bundeswehr a healthier workplace by creating wellness management projects for physical
and mental health. Proposed projects are stress management and prevention, assistance in
abstention from smoking and addition prevention, and sport and fitness options.
A necessity in both the wellness of personnel and increasing the attractiveness of
the Bundeswehr as an employer is modernizing the available housing accommodations.
Attempts for modernization will help Bundeswehr personnel feel at home and
comfortable in their military accommodations. 750 million Euros have been designated
for this modernization process and improvements will include new light and modern
furniture, and each room will come standard with a television and refrigerator.126
Additionally, Internet will be made available wherever possible in housing
accommodations with priority given to those at training schools.
The last topic of reform set forth by the agenda is titled “Anchoring the
Bundeswehr in Society”. In order to do accomplish this, three solutions are set forth; the
presentation of an annual award for “Bundeswehr in Society”, a national Day of the
Bundeswehr which will allow military personnel to interact personally with German
citizens, and the erection of exhibitions in various locations which would demonstrate the
locations unique history and services of that particular locale.
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Many of the reforms set forth in Bundeswehr. Aktiv. Attrakitv. Anders., were set to
begin in 2014 and 2015 through pilot programs. Although it is still too early to gauge the
success of the campaign, Federal Minster of Defense Ursula von der Leyen said the
Bundeswehr has the most recruits since the end of conscription.127 Von der Leyen’s
campaign to transform the Bundeswehr into an attractive and competitive employer in
Germany is designed to yield long term results that will ideally benefit military and
civilian personnel, their families, the Bundeswehr as an institution, all while maintaining
and deepening the relationship between the armed forces and German society. Critics and
individuals from opposition political groups support the agenda but display hesitation
while emphasizing that there is much more work to be done and that it will be a costly
process.128
German-Russian Relations, the Ukraine and Syria
Relations between Germany and Russia are politically, economically and
culturally complex. At the end of World War II, Soviet troops occupied (some would say
liberated) eastern Germany and in some circles, they are seen as the heroes. During the
period of German division the Soviet Union served as the supervisory power over the
German Democratic Republic (GDR). The Soviet Union’s role in the economic
development of the GDR resulted in lasting partnerships after German reunification and
the fall of the Soviet Union. It has been the overt stance of German politicians that
Russian integration into Europe is necessary and historically political and economic
policies have been enforced to support this belief. The current political climate between
Russia and Western countries, as well as the conflict in the Ukraine and now in Syria are
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hindering the integration process and negatively impacting the relationship between
Germany and the Russian Federation.
According to the German Auswärtiges Amt (Federal Foreign Office) website the
German-Russian relationship was founded on close and open exchange of political ideas,
close economic ties, culture and education exchange and broad civil-society discussion.
As of 2008, Germany and Russia began a “Modernization Partnership” aimed at
strengthening their relations and cooperation in regards to law, health and demography,
energy efficiency, transportation infrastructure and education.129 The driving force for
positive German-Russian relations are common interests, such as human rights, regular
consultations regarding policy between the countries and strong economic
partnerships.130
Recently, German-Russian relations have become strained in light of Russia’s
annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the current conflict in the Ukraine. Politically,
relations have been deteriorating since 2011 and the implementation of Russian President
Vladimir Putin’s Eurasian Union project, which has resulted in a trend in Russia to gain
control of civil-society and the reliance on internal resources rather than American and
European partnerships.131 These trends have led Russian foreign and domestic policies to
stray from the fundamental principles upon which German-Russian relations were built.
In response to the changes in Russian political policies, German policy has also seen a
shift taking into account the realities of the situation in Russia.132
In addition to a decline in the political relationship between Russia and Germany,
the economic partnership has also been negatively affected. Although Russia is not
Germany’s leading export or import country, in 2014 Russia accounted for 2.6% of
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Germany’s total exports and 4.21% of its imports.133 In 2015, trade between Germany
and Russia dropped by 35%.134 Russia’s annexation of Crimea and involvement in the
Ukraine have led to the imposition of economic sanctions in lieu of military involvement
by NATO and European Union member nations, including Germany. Historically in
situations with Russia as they are in now, such as in 2008 when Russia tried to take
control of Georgia, Germany has reverted back to maintaining the economic relations
rather than maintaining a firm stance, but as of now the German government remains
strong-handed toward the sanctions on Russia.135 This stance demonstrates the shift in
German-Russian relations, as well as Germany commitment to supporting its allies.
German civil-society is often seen as sympathetic to Russia,136 but polls
conducted in 2015 reveal that opinions on Russia and what should be done in dealing
with current situations vary greatly. According to a Pew Research Poll published in June
2015, only 27% of the reported Germans support Russia, and 23% have favorable views
of Putin.137 When asked about the crisis in the Ukraine, 29% of the Germans surveyed
saw Russia as primarily responsible for the conflict in the Ukraine and 86% of those
surveyed viewed the country as some sort of threat to its neighbors, either minor or
major.138 The survey also revealed that 71% of Germans polled support Economic Aid to
Ukraine, only 19% favor NATO supplying the Ukraine with arms and 38% surveyed
believe that Germany should use military force to defend a NATO ally in serious conflict
with Russia.139
Despite political and economic strains between Germany and Russia, both nations
aim to end the crisis in Syria. The war in Syria began as a political uprising in 2011
against President Bashar al-Assad’s regime; by 2013 it was an all out civil war.140 More
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than 250,000 people have been killed and to complicate matters, the Islamic extremist
group, the Islamic State has entered Syria and gained control of northeast parts of the
warring country.141 As a result of the civil war and Islamic State recruitment and attacks,
violence in the region has escalated and over four million people have fled Syria seeking
asylum, creating a global humanitarian and migrant crisis.142
In recent months, the pressure on world powers to intervene in Syria has been
growing and in September 2015, Russia launched air strikes targeting Islamic State
territories in Syria.143 Many western governments have criticized Russia’s actions in
Syria, and have accused Russia of targeting opposition fighters supported by the United
States and other western countries.144 Despite Germany’s alliances in the west and lack of
support for the al-Assad government, German officials have said that the al-Assad
government and coalition with countries such as Russia, Iran, Iraq and Turkey are
imperative for the resolution of the civil war in Syria.145 Germany’s historical relations
with Russia has allowed them to continue be strategically placed between the global east
and west.
The United Kingdom and France have also shown interest in sending military
forces to intervene in Syria in the fight against the Islamic State, to which the foreign
minister of Germany was openly critical and warned that it could worsen the situation.146
As the debates continue on how to resolve both the civil war in Syria and how to reclaim
the territories occupied by the Islamic State, Germany and other states in the region are
scrambling to accommodate the hordes of refugee and asylum seekers from Syria. In
Germany, Federal Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen is utilizing the Bundeswehr to
assist those entering Germany. Throughout the country, soldiers are helping build tents,
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assemble beds and deliver food and other necessities.147 The Bundeswehr is enacting a
concept “Helfende Hände” (Helping Hands) to help accommodate the refugees and
asylum seekers.148 According to the Bundeswehr website, as of November 2015, eighty
projects are underway with participation of 6,000 Bundeswehr personnel.149
Germany is working to adhere to its global partnerships while advocating for what
it believes is the best plan of action. German-Russian relations, founded on common
interests are strained due to Russia’s deviation from those principles and actions both
domestically and internationally, specifically in the Ukraine. Germany stands with the
rest of the western nations in urging Russia to reform its policies and work harder to
alleviate the conflict in the Ukraine. Western countries and Russia acknowledge the
importance of ending the crisis in Syria but cannot come to the table to discuss a
diplomatic resolution. While Germany encourages Russian involvement in developing a
solution, it does not advocate for military escalation on either side, instead the country is
choosing to stand in the middle calling for east and west to reconcile their differences in
the interest of helping those displaced and in danger as a result of the crisis in Syria. The
words of German government officials can only go so far, and in maintaining their
humanitarian position, Germany is doing what it can to alleviate the situation for refugee
and asylum seekers by employing the Bundeswehr in maximizing accommodations and
services to those entering Germany.
Chancellor Angela Merkel has until recently maintained an open door policy to
refugee and asylum seekers during the Syrian migration crisis. In mid-November of 2015,
it was estimated that between 450,000 to 800,000 refugees would enter Germany.150
Merkel did not harbor the support of many in Germany, including members of her own
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party, the Christian Democratic Union and her own Minister of the Interior, Thomas de
Maiziére. Those opposing Merkel expressed concern that there is a lack of resources
needed to effectively resettle and integrate refugees in Germany.151 According to a
Spiegel Online article from November 20, 2015, Chancellor Merkel, at the G-20 Summit
in Turkey less than a week earlier, alluded to a quota system for refugees entering
European nations in order to better manage the influx of people. The transition of
Merkel’s stance on limiting the number of refugees settling Germany does not necessarily
signify a change in her policy stance, but rather a practical realization of the country’s
resource capacity and lack of sustainability of up to 10,000 refugees entering the country
each day.152
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Chapter Five
Conclusion
The gray area within Germany’s challenge to find a balance between adhering to
international demands and maintaining the civil-military relationship between the
German people and the Bundeswehr inhibits the ability to differentiate black and white.
German history played a significant role in the establishment of the Bundeswehr and
served as a demonstration that the reconstruction of a democratic government was
proving successful. For decades after World War II, Germans were perceived as villains,
a sentiment, which led to Germans carrying a historical burden that became embedded in
their culture. It has been seventy years since the end of World War II, the world has
changed greatly and Germany has become a well-respected nation in the international
community, yet the impact of the historical burden lingers within German society and is
made apparent by public opinion.
The German government has made efforts to adapt to the changing world and the
changing role that Germany plays in geopolitics. The White Paper 2006, outlined reforms
to the German Defense Ministry and the Bundeswehr in response to the changing
geopolitical climate and global security threats, most significantly marked by the terrorist
attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. The reforms set forth were aimed at
adapting to unfamiliar security challenges and increasing Germany’s capabilities as a
military ally, all while operating within the confines of the German Basic Law and the
core concept of Innere Führung. The 2011 ending of compulsory military service was a
direct tug on the German civil-military relationship.
The expansion of Bundeswehr capabilities discussed in the White Paper 2006 was
not so drastic to cause a significant wedge between the armed forces and the German

54
people. The shock and strain on the civil-military relationship was magnified by the
simultaneous involvement in international conflict. Germany’s assertion to take on more
responsibility is politically positive for the country, but the seemingly sudden increase in
international and military engagement, have not yet been navigated by German society.
The culture of pacifism and relative isolationism of the German public is now
generational; culture and societal norms do not change because policies change.
Security threats and challenges continue to evolve, as do the policies set in place
to address them. Reforms presented in the White Paper 2006, as well as those which will
be published in the White Paper 2016 provide mechanisms to align Germany with its
allies as a positive contributing force to global, European and domestic security. While
the Bundeswehr has modernized operationally and strategically, on the level of the
soldiers and their relations with society, there is still much to do. Federal Defense
Minister, Ursula von der Leyen has taken the initiative to modernize the
personnel/personal part of the Bundeswehr. Although it is too soon to evaluate the
success of her campaign to improve the attractiveness of the Bundeswehr, it has the
potential to cultivate the societal transformation needed to adapt the German civilmilitary relationship to current situations. By boosting morale within the armed forces,
the change in self-perception of the soldier could have an impact on greater society’s
perception of the soldier.
This thesis set out to discover how Germany would find a balance between the
international call to do more within the global defense community, and the
constitutionally bound civil-military relationship. The civil-military relationship
characterized by Innere Führung translated to the solider being a citizen in uniform. The
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Bundeswehr reforms appeared to challenge concept of the citizen in uniform, but maybe
what it means to be a citizen and consequently a citizen in uniform just needs to be
redefined. International terrorism, cyber threats, complex international relations and
humanitarian crises are the reality of our globalized world and the dissolution of borders
and transnational partnerships define the future. The modernization of the Bundeswehr
and the increased involvement has not swayed Germany from their moral compass and
therefore it has not been unfaithful to its people. The country has remained vocal with its
reservations regarding military conflicts, and modernizing the military and increased
involvement does not define the global role Germany will take, but rather places it in a
strategic position to assert its values and cultivate collaborative transnational relations.
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